Quantum-Inspired Correlated Governance: A Parametric Correlator for Anti-Corruption in Evolutionary Hawk–Dove Games

Abstract This paper proposes a formal theoretical model that integrates classical strategic correlation, quantum game theory, and evolutionary dynamics in the context of institutional corruption. I introduce a classical parametric correlator K(λ), defined as a convex combination of strategic independence and the Fréchet–Hoeffding bounds (upper for positive λ and lower for negative λ), into a two-population Hawk–Dove game with enforcement. The correlator modifies both encounter probabilities and the effective transaction costs of legal compliance. The closed-form analysis and the baseline simulations are conducted on the symmetric invariant manifold x = y = z, while the general asymmetric system remains piecewise. A reduced-form alignment-calibration bridge maps the normalized analytical selection differential into material-payoff units and aligns its local stability root with the frequency-dependent replicator integrated numerically; the resulting baseline threshold is λ * = 1/3. For 0 ≤ λ < λ * , the baseline calibration exhibits a stable interior corruption branch, whereas above λ * the honest corner is locally asymptotically stable. Because convergence slows close to the bifurcation, the finite-horizon numerical honesty threshold is reached only when λ is sufficiently above λ * . I derive a restricted Eisert–Wilkens–Lewenstein I/X benchmark and use λ = sin2(γ), the squared concurrence (tangle), solely as a scalar calibration of entanglement strength. I show that, on the symmetric manifold, this restricted I/X distribution collapses to the independent product distribution for every γ, whereas the classical correlator remains concordant for λ > 0. The exact lower Fréchet–Hoeffding branch is used for λ < 0, preserving non-negativity and the stated marginals. The simulations identify a valid adversarial high-risk region under negative dependence and a welfare-improving cooperation corridor under sufficiently positive alignment. Policy implications focus on avoiding adversarial dependence and combining institutional alignment with conventional enforcement.