Quick Navigation

Topics

Quantum Cryptography Security

Random Variation of Detector Efficiency: A Countermeasure against Detector Blinding Attacks for Quantum Key Distribution

arXiv
Authors: Charles Ci Wen Lim, Nino Walenta, Matthieu Legre, Nicolas Gisin, Hugo Zbinden

Year

2014

Paper ID

47886

Status

Preprint

Abstract Read

~2 min

Abstract Words

96

Citations

N/A

Abstract

In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks. In particular, by exploiting the internal working knowledge of practical detectors, it is possible to bring them to an operating region whereby only certain target detectors are sensitive to detections. Crucially, the adversary can use this loophole to learn everything about the secret key without introducing any error to the quantum channel. In this work, as a step towards overcoming detector blinding attacks, we focus on an experimentally convenient countermeasure, where the efficiency of the detectors is randomly varied.

Why This Paper Matters

  • This paper contributes to the Quantum Cryptography & Security research area in the Quantum Articles archive.
  • It adds a 2014 reference point for readers tracking recent quantum research.
  • In the recent decade, it has been discovered that QKD systems are extremely vulnerable to side-channel attacks.

Paper Tools

Become a member to use research tools

Sign in to open papers, visit source links, share, cite, compare, copy DOI links, request category corrections, and build your reading list.

Show Paper arXiv Publisher Share Cite This Paper Copy URL Compare Copy DOI Add to Reading List Category Correction Request

References & Citation Signals

Local Citation Graph (Related-Paper Links)

Current Paper #47886

External citation index: OpenAlex citation signal

Community Reactions

Quick sentiment from readers on this paper.

Score: 0
Likes: 0 Dislikes: 0

Sign in to react to this paper.

Discussion & Reviews (Moderated)

Average Rating: 0.0 / 5 (0 ratings)

No written reviews yet.