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Nash equilibria in four-strategy quantum game extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma

arXiv
Authors: Piotr Frąckiewicz, Anna Gorczyca-Goraj, Krzysztof Grzanka, Katarzyna Nowakowska, Marek Szopa

Year

2024

Paper ID

37292

Status

Preprint

Abstract Read

~2 min

Abstract Words

112

Citations

N/A

Abstract

This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.

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  • It adds a 2024 reference point for readers tracking recent quantum research.
  • This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma.

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