Quick Navigation
Topics
Quantum Algorithms
Nash equilibria in four-strategy quantum game extensions of the Prisoner's Dilemma
arXiv
Authors: Piotr Frąckiewicz, Anna Gorczyca-Goraj, Krzysztof Grzanka, Katarzyna Nowakowska, Marek Szopa
Year
2024
Paper ID
37292
Status
Preprint
Abstract Read
~2 min
Abstract Words
112
Citations
N/A
Abstract
This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma. The quantization process involves extending the classical game by introducing two additional unitary strategies. We consider five classes of such quantum games, which remain invariant under isomorphic transformations of the classical game. For each class, we identify and analyse all possible Nash equilibria. Our results reveal the complexity and diversity of strategic behaviour in the quantum setting, providing new insights into the dynamics of classical decision-making dilemmas. In the case of the standard Prisoner's Dilemma, the resulting Nash equilibria of quantum extensions are found to be closer to Pareto optimal solutions than those of the classical equilibrium.
Why This Paper Matters
- It adds a 2024 reference point for readers tracking recent quantum research.
- This paper investigates Nash equilibria in pure strategies for quantum approach to the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Paper Tools
Become a member to use research tools
Sign in to open papers, visit source links, share, cite, compare, copy DOI links, request category corrections, and build your reading list.
Show Paper arXiv Publisher Share
Cite This Paper
Copy URL
Compare
Copy DOI Add to Reading List
Category Correction Request
Category Correction Request
Help us improve classification quality by proposing a better category. Every request is reviewed by an admin.
Sign in to submit a category correction request for this paper.
Log In to SubmitReferences & Citation Signals
Community Reactions
Quick sentiment from readers on this paper.
Score:
0
Likes: 0
Dislikes: 0
Sign in to react to this paper.
Discussion & Reviews (Moderated)
Average Rating: 0.0 / 5 (0 ratings)
No written reviews yet.