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Quantum Foundations
The equivalence of Bell's inequality and the Nash inequality in a quantum game-theoretic setting
arXiv
Authors: Azhar Iqbal, James M. Chappell, Derek Abbott
Year
2015
Paper ID
27928
Status
Preprint
Abstract Read
~2 min
Abstract Words
140
Citations
N/A
Abstract
The interaction of competing agents is described by classical game theory. It is now well known that this can be extended to the quantum domain, where agents obey the rules of quantum mechanics. This is of emerging interest for exploring quantum foundations, quantum protocols, quantum auctions, quantum cryptography, and the dynamics of quantum cryptocurrency, for example. In this paper, we investigate two-player games in which a strategy pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium when the games obey the rules of quantum mechanics. Using a generalized Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) setting for two-player quantum games, and considering a particular strategy pair, we identify sets of games for which the pair can exist as a Nash equilibrium only when Bell's inequality is violated. We thus determine specific games for which the Nash inequality becomes equivalent to Bell's inequality for the considered strategy pair.
Why This Paper Matters
- This paper contributes to the Quantum Foundations research area in the Quantum Articles archive.
- It adds a 2015 reference point for readers tracking recent quantum research.
- The interaction of competing agents is described by classical game theory.
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