Quick Navigation
Topics
Quantum Cryptography Security
Quantum Error Correction Fault Tolerance
Entanglement Theory Quantum Correlations
Avoiding the Detector Blinding Attack on Quantum Cryptography
arXiv
Authors: Z L Yuan, J F Dynes, A J Shields
Year
2010
Paper ID
11058
Status
Preprint
Abstract Read
~2 min
Abstract Words
55
Citations
N/A
Abstract
We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors that are operated correctly. The attack is only successful if a redundant resistor is included in series with the APD, or if the detector discrimination levels are set inappropriately.
Why This Paper Matters
- This paper contributes to the Quantum Error Correction & Fault Tolerance research area in the Quantum Articles archive.
- It adds a 2010 reference point for readers tracking recent quantum research.
- We show the detector blinding attack by Lydersen et al [1] will be ineffective on most single photon avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and certainly ineffective on any detectors...
Paper Tools
Become a member to use research tools
Sign in to open papers, visit source links, share, cite, compare, copy DOI links, request category corrections, and build your reading list.
Show Paper arXiv Publisher Share
Cite This Paper
Copy URL
Compare
Copy DOI Add to Reading List
Category Correction Request
Category Correction Request
Help us improve classification quality by proposing a better category. Every request is reviewed by an admin.
Sign in to submit a category correction request for this paper.
Log In to SubmitReferences & Citation Signals
Community Reactions
Quick sentiment from readers on this paper.
Score:
0
Likes: 0
Dislikes: 0
Sign in to react to this paper.
Discussion & Reviews (Moderated)
Average Rating: 0.0 / 5 (0 ratings)
No written reviews yet.